Architecture (AR) Suit

DBD Cornucopia > Deck > Architecture

The Architecture (AR) suit is a clustering of threats around the technological structure of the service, its data, its systems and access to these, including all its supporting parts.

All six suits are broad groupings of threats which, while useful for game play, should not be allowed to restrict thinking about either where and how the threats defined on each card could or do arise, nor the types and locations of harms occuring. If suits overly dominate thinking, it can be useful to think about 'what would be revealed if this threat card was in a different suit?'.

The other suits in the deck are: Scope, Agency, Trust, Porosity and Cornucopia (plus Jokers).

Thirteen Cards in the Architecture Suit

Each suit is a broad grouping of threats, and are relevant to all sort of implementation team roles and stages of the service lifecycle. The suit names should neither constrain thinking about implementation choices which may cause the threat, nor restrict the types of harm identified.

Theo formulates identity verification resulting in limited ways to verify new accounts (e.g. trusted identifiers like other existing government login credentials cannot be used)

AR-2

Oakley pulls the service into a shape which largely or completely excludes the use of paper for any input and output by claimants (e.g. submitting information on paper forms, formatting output for print, sending and receiving formal correspondence by post)

AR-3

Jacob automates input, but partially completed forms/elements are not saved automatically as claimants progress, pause, wait, time out or log out

AR-4

Amelia assembles the system which does not work well on devices with lower resolution or smaller screens (e.g. TVs, mobile phones)

AR-5

Louis forms the system with a reliance on internal or external messaging (e.g. chat, email) to accomplish some or many claimant-related activities, instead of providing dedicated features, leading to more unstructured data

AR-6

Ethan is instrumental in the way claimant identities are not linked to other data held by government, and/or are done so but without consent, and/or are only done so to the detriment of claimants rather than to assist them

AR-7

Zara does not enact any live (synchronous) individual claimant help and support by decision-makers via any channel, and/or only via limited channels, and/or only at limited days/times

AR-8

Lyla makes it necessary for claimants to upgrade their hardware/software too often

AR-9

Florence implements some features requiring a greater degree of reliability, continuity, capacity and on-demand availability of internet connection, than claimants sometimes have

AR-10

Otis increases the amount of time and/or effort claimants (and/or people/organisations in their support networks) have to expend to make and maintain claims

AR-J

Arlo sets up some features to be only available on request (i.e. claimants have to know about them and then ask to use them), and/or features to be only available dependent upon factors beyond claimants` control (e.g. visible but requiring a government official to enable them)

AR-Q

Phoebe frames online accounts so that claimants do not have any access at all to their own prior claims and their related information after they are refused, closed, or ended in some other manner, and regardless of whether the claims were submitted or not

AR-K

You have invented a new implementation decision related to service architecture that is harmful to claimants

AR-A

Note About Card Values

Card values (e.g. 3, 8, King) are for game play and are not correlated with the severity of harm. This is because threats cannot be ranked directly since they can affect individuals in different ways due to situations and circumstances, or affect fewer or more claimants, or the harms can arise in claimants' support networks and wider society.